



12 March 2012

Dear Clients, Partners, and Friends,

The results for South Ocean Managementø Delaware LP, Kong Partnersø L.P., before incentive fees, were as follows:



	<u>Feb 2012</u>	<u>Year-to-Date</u>
Hong Kong Partners LP *	7.9%	11.4%
Hang Seng Index **	6.3%	17.6%
MSCI HK Small Cap Index	11.9%	18.8%

PartnersøNAV for Feb \$2.6211 after management fee, but before annual incentive fees of 15% on appreciation.

The Hong Kong blue chip, Hang Seng Index, has gone straight up since the first week this year.



Our smaller/mid cap stocks were under-performers in January, out-performers in February (playing catch-up). They rose last month on no particular news either. (Perhaps the liquidity tsunami from global central banks was the reasoní note these next two charts).



Source: [Bianco Research](#) via [The Big Picture blog](#)

The sudden upturn in the markets this year caught many investors on the sidelines and off guard. It wouldn't be surprising to see the market take a respite for the time being.

Meanwhile, our holdings of fast growth, China-gearred Hong Kong listed stocks languished at extremely low valuations. Our portfolio's estimated price to earnings ratio (weighted) for this year is 2.8 times vs. 10.9 times for the blue chip index (Bloomberg consensus).

Shares of Chaoda Modern Agriculture, a long time core holding, remained under suspension as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange seeks more information from the company relating to the anonymous fraud accusations made in September last year. Importantly, last month, Chaoda made a significant move: it bought back all US\$200 million of its outstanding convertible bonds in the market.

This action thereby reduces the cash position and removes from its balance sheet both the only significant debt obligation and the prospect of equity dilution via conversion of these bonds.

Chaoda is now a far less leveraged enterprise. The rating agency, S&P, upon the occasion of their withdrawal of the company's rating (just before the company made good on the bonds), wondered whether the failure to pay the bondholders constituted default.

That question has been rendered moot.

Consequently, all accusations of fraud aimed at the company's management about absconding with the corporate cash are now irrelevant as well.

The focus will shift back to the Hong Kong securities regulator's (SFC) misconduct tribunal regarding allegations of insider trading. The company is mounting a forceful defense, but, as one of our advisors aptly said, "only a fool would guess the outcome."

The last hearing at the Tribunal was reportedly March 2.

There has been very little communication from management because of the insider trading tribunal hearings (their lawyers have them gagged).

The end of this saga, though, seems to be getting closer.

To give an example how cheap stocks have become in Hong Kong, earlier this year, I attended a luncheon in Kowloon and sat next to an executive director I had met on several occasions when investigating small/mid cap companies listed in Hong Kong. He is the CFO of a fast growing company producing and retailing a popular line of consumer items in China. I asked how his business was doing these days, and he told me, in a nutshell, it wasn't nearly as bad as what the stock market posited.

He explained their business was expected to grow at 15+% this year (after a year of industry-wide excess inventory sell-down) and the shares were selling at five times those expected earnings. The company boasts no long term debt and cash equivalent to HK\$1.15

per share (for an even lower ex-cash PE). The stock had collapsed from a high of HK\$6.20 per share to 52-week low of \$2.16. Lastly, the shares were selling at a 10% dividend yield.

I bought a 3% position for our portfolios the following morning at around HK\$2.40 per share, based on the chance meeting.

The shares now trade at \$3.20, 30+% higher than our cost, yet sell at just 7.2 times expected earnings. Still cheap!

Below is an article by the Oracle from Omaha who makes a compelling argument for equities. His way of thinking can be viewed as similar to our philosophy of owning Chinese managed/controlled companies listed in Hong Kong with expanding businesses geared at China's continued growth. Hope you enjoy.

Sincerely,

Brook McConnell

President

Email: brook@south-ocean.com Website: www.south-ocean.com

Hong Kong

Warren Buffett: Why stocks beat gold and bonds

February 9, 2012: 5:00 AM ET

In an adaptation from his upcoming shareholder letter, the Oracle of Omaha explains why equities almost always beat the alternatives over time.

By *Warren Buffett*



PHOTO: PETER YANG FORTUNE -- Investing is often described as

the process of laying out money now in the expectation of receiving more money in the future. At Berkshire Hathaway (**BRKA**) we take a more demanding approach, defining investing as the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power -- *after taxes have been paid on nominal gains* -- in the future. More succinctly, investing is forgoing consumption now in order to have the ability to consume more at a later date.

From our definition there flows an important corollary: The riskiness of an investment is *not* measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability -- the *reasoned* probability -- of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period. Assets can fluctuate greatly in price and not be risky as long as they are reasonably certain to deliver increased purchasing power over their holding period. And as we will see, a nonfluctuating asset can be laden with risk.

Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it's important to understand the characteristics of each. So let's survey the field.

Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages, bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as "safe." In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.

Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of **investors in many countries**, even as these holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such policies spin out of control.



Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86% in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than \$7 today to buy what \$1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would have been kidding themselves if they thought of *any* portion of that interest as "income."

For taxpaying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would have yielded *nothing* in the way of real income. This investor's visible income tax would have stripped him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining 4.3 points. It's noteworthy that the implicit inflation "tax" was more than triple the explicit income tax that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. "In God We Trust" may be imprinted on our currency, but the hand that activates our government's printing press has been all too human.

High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based investments -- and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. **Current rates**, however, do not come close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a warning label.

Warren Buffett: Your pick for Businessperson of the Year

Under today's conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample liquidity occupies center stage and will *never* be slighted, however inadequate rates may be. Accommodating this need, we primarily hold **U.S. Treasury bills**, the only investment that can be counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity is \$20 billion; \$10 billion is our absolute minimum.

Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain -- either because a particular credit is mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we've exploited both opportunities in the past -- and may do so again -- we are now 180 degrees removed from such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems apt: "Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk."

The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are purchased in the buyer's hope that someone else -- who also knows that the assets will be forever unproductive -- will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of such buyers in the 17th century.

This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are *not* inspired by what the asset itself can produce -- it will remain lifeless forever -- but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more avidly in the future.



The major asset in this category is gold, currently **a huge favorite of investors** who fear almost all other assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however, has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still own one ounce at its end.


What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis. As "bandwagon" investors join any party, they create their own truth -- *for a while*.

Over the past 15 years, both **Internet stocks** and **houses** have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the "proof" delivered by the market, and the pool of buyers -- for a time -- expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: "What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end."

Today the world's gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At \$1,750 per ounce -- gold's price as I write this -- its value would be about \$9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.

Let's now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy *all* U.S. cropland (400 million acres with output of about \$200

billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world's most profitable company, one earning more than \$40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would have about \$1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying binge). Can you imagine an investor with \$9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?




Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today's annual production of gold command about \$160 billion. Buyers -- whether jewelry and industrial users, frightened individuals, or speculators -- must continually absorb this additional supply to merely maintain an equilibrium at present prices.

A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn, wheat, cotton, and other crops - - and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the currency may be. Exxon Mobil (**XOM**) will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The 170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can fondle the cube, but it will not respond.

Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it's likely many **will still rush to gold**. I'm confident, however, that the \$9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.

Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency collapse fosters movement to sterile assets **such as gold**. We heard

"cash is king" in late 2008, just when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard "cash is trash" in the early 1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.



My own preference -- and you knew this was coming -- is our third category: investment in productive assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola (**KO**), **IBM** (**IBM**), and our own See's Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies -- think of our regulated utilities, for example -- fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to nonproductive or currency-based assets.

Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper (as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola or some See's peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce for what others produce.

Our country's businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens. Metaphorically, these commercial "cows" will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of "milk" to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as well).

Berkshire's goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be to own them in their entirety -- but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to be the runaway winner among the three we've examined. More important, it will be *by far* the safest.

This article is from the February 27, 2012 issue of Fortune.

***Hong Kong Partners LP risk disclaimer:**

- Hong Kong Partners LP (The "Fund") primarily invests in the Hong Kong equity market with a Greater China focus.
- The Fund invests in China-related companies which involve certain risks not typically associated with investment in more developed markets, such as greater political, tax, economic, foreign exchange, liquidity and regulatory risks.
- The Fund is also subject to concentration risk due to its concentration in Hong Kong, particularly China-related companies. The value of the Fund can be extremely volatile and could go down substantially within a short period of time. It is possible that a substantial value of your investment could be lost.
- You should not make investment decision on the basis of this material alone. Please read the explanatory private placement memorandum for details and risk factors.

****Index Descriptions:** The Hang Seng Indexes are a widely recognized capitalization-weighted indexes that measures the performance of the three largest-capitalization sectors of the Hong Kong stock market in descending order. The Hang Seng Index measures the largest 52 market capitalized listed companies in Hong Kong's stock market. The Hang Seng Mid Cap Index represents the next 193 largest capitalized listed companies, the Hang Seng Small Cap Index represents the next 187 largest capitalized listed companies in Hong Kong.

The MSCI HK Small Cap Index is a free float-adjusted market cap weighted index designed to measure the performance of small cap equity securities in the bottom 15% of equity market capitalization in Hong Kong. With 69 constituents, the index represents approximately 14% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization of the Hong Kong equity universe.

The Hong Kong Partners LP (HKP) is benchmark agnostic and its corresponding portfolio may have significant noncorrelation to any index. The portfolios may invest in all sectors (within and/or on other stock markets) and the composition of securities in the portfolio may change periodically depending on market conditions at the time. Securities in the portfolio will not match those in any index.

Index returns are generally provided as an overall market indicator. You cannot invest directly in an index. Although reinvestment of dividend and interest payments is assumed, no expenses are netted against an index's returns. Index performance information was furnished by sources deemed reliable and is believed to be accurate, however, no warranty or representation is made as to the accuracy thereof and the information is subject to correction.

Before investing you should carefully consider the Partnership's investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. This and other information are in the prospectus, a copy for Accredited Investors may be obtained by inquiring to info@south-ocean.com. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.

The principal risks of investing in HKP: Equity Securities Risk. The value of the equity securities the Fund holds may fall due to general market and economic conditions. Foreign Securities Risk. Investments in the securities of foreign issuers involve risks beyond those associated with investments in U.S. securities. Industrials Sector Risk. Companies in the industrials sector may be adversely affected by changes in government regulation, world events, economic conditions, environmental damages, product liability claims and exchange rates. Consumer Discretionary Risk. Companies in this sector may be adversely impacted by changes in domestic/international economies, exchange/interest rates, social trends and consumer preferences. Information Technology Sector Risk. Information technology companies face intense competition, both domestically and internationally, which may have an adverse effect on profit margins. Detailed information regarding the specific risks of Hong Kong Partners LP can be found in the prospectus. Additional risks of investing in HKP include equity, market, management and non-diversification risks, as well as fluctuations in market value and NAV. An investment in a private limited partnership is subject to risks and you can lose money on your investment in the limited partnership.

There can be no assurance that HKP will achieve its investment objective. The LP's portfolio is more volatile than broad market averages. Shares of HKP cannot be bought or sold publicly, there is no active market in the Units and there are restrictions imposed on Limited Partnership unit transfers. Partnership redemptions are handled by Authorized Administrators of the Partnership.